DIMACS and The Princeton Center for Computational Intractability
Joint Workshop on Decentralized Mechanism Design, Distributed Computing, and Cryptography
June 3 - June 4, 2010
Nassau Inn, Princeton, NJ
- Organizers:
- Ittai Abraham, Microsoft
- Dino Gerardi, Yale University
- Joe Halpern, Cornell University
Workshop Program:
For the most updated program, please check the
Center for Computational Intractability website at:
http://intractability.princeton.edu/files/2010/05/workshopsched.txt
Thursday, June 3, 2010
9:00 - 9:05 Welcome
9:05 - 9:55 Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory
Francoise Forges
9:55 - 10:45 Rational Secret Sharing: A Survey
Jonathan Katz
10:45 - 11:10 break
11:10 - 12:00 Distributed Computing Meets Game Theory
Joe Halpern
12:00 - 1:30 lunch
1:30 - 1:55 Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
Rann Smorodinsky
1:55 - 2:20 Approximate Privacy: Foundations and Quantification
Joan Feigenbaum
2:20 - 2:45 Perfect Implementation of Arbitrary Mechanisms
Silvio Micali
2:45 - 3:20 break
3:20 - 3:45 Effective Communication in Cheap Talk Games
Navin Karthik
3:45 - 4:10 Language Barriers
Andreas Blume
4:10 - 4:35 Game Theory with Costly Computation
Rafael Pass
4:35 - 5:00
5:00 - 5:45 rump session: Lucia Penso, Tal Moran, Jing Chen, Edmund
Wong, Tim van Zandt, Anniket Ket, Marie Laclau
7:00 - 10:00 workshop dinner
Friday, June 4, 2010
9:00 - 9:25 Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
Ludovic Renou
9:25 - 9:50 Asynchronous Distributed Computing with Adaptive Heuristics
Aaron Jaggard
9:50 - 10:25 When is it best to best-reply?
Michael Schapira
10:25 - 10:50 break
10:50 - 11:15 From communication equilibria to correlated equilibria
Peter Vid
11:15 - 11:40 Ittai Abraham
11:40 - 12:05 Lorenzo Alvisi
12:05 - 1:30 lunch
1:30 - 1:55 Detecting Profitable Deviations
David Rahman
1:55 - 2:20 Mediated Contracts and Mechanism Design
Roland Strausz
2:20 - 2:45 The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade
Johannes Horner
2:45 - 3:10 rump session: David Rahman, +++
3:10 - 3:35 break
3:35 - 4:10 Sequential Rationality in Cryptographic Protocols
Alon Rosen
4:10 - 4:35 Short Non-Interactive Cryptographic Proofs
Michael Fischer
4:35 - 5:00 Inefficiency of equilibria in query
auctions with continuous valuations
Rudolf Muller
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Document last modified on May 24, 2010.