DIMACS Workshop on the Boundary between Economic Theory and Computer Science

October 24 - 26, 2007
DIMACS Center, CoRE Building, Rutgers University

Organizers:

Lance Fortnow, University of Chicago, fortnow@cs.uchicago.edu

Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern University, r-vohra@kellogg.northwestern.edu

Workshop Program:

Wednesday, October 24, 2007

 8:00 -  8:45  Breakfast and Registration
  
 8:45 -  9:00  Welcome and Opening Remarks 
               Fred Roberts, DIMACS Director
  
 9:00 -  9:50  Invited Talk: A Commitment Folk Theorem
               Ehud Kalai, Northwestern University

 9:50 - 10:05  Break
  
10:05 - 10:55  Invited Talk: Behavioral Games on Networks
               Michael Kearns, University of Pennsylvania

10:55 - 11:10  Break
  
11:10 - 11:40  Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach
               Stephan Lauermann, University of Bonn

11:40 - 12:10  Uncoordinated Two-sided Markets
               Heiner Ackermann, RWTH Aachen, Paul Goldberg, University of Liverpool, 
               Vahab Mirrokni, Microsoft Research, Heiko Roglin and Berthold Vocking, RWTH Aachen

12:10 -  2:00  Lunch
  
 2:00 -  2:50  Invited Talk: Learning in Networks
               Sanjeev Goyal, Cambridge University
               
 2:50 -  3:05  Break
  
 3:05 -  3:55  Invited Talk: Open Problems in Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing
               Joan Feigenbaum, Yale University

 3:55 -  4:10  Break
  
 4:10 -  4:40  Betting with Budgets
               Alina Beygelzimer, Yiling Chen, Nicolas Lambert,
               John Langford, David Pennock, Daniel Reeves,
               Bethany Soule, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik and Jennifer Wortman

 4:45 -  5:15  Incentive-Compatible Distributed Routing
               Hagay Levin, Michael Schapira and Aviv Zohar, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

 5:20 -  5:50  Encouraging Cooperation in Sharing Supermodular Costs
               Andreas Schulz and Nelson Uhan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  
Thursday, October 25, 2007
 
 8:30 -  9:00  Breakfast and Registration

 9:00 -  9:50  Invited Talk: Combinatoric Auctions
               John Ledyard, Caltech

 9:50 - 10:05  Break
  
10:05 - 10:55  Invited Talk: Trust-Based Recommendation Systems
               Jennifer Chayes, Microsoft Research
               Presented by Adam Kalai

10:55 - 11:10  Break
  
11:10 - 11:40  No-Regret Learning in Convex Games
               Geoffrey Gordon, Carnegie-Mellon University,
               Amy Greenwald and Casey Marks, Brown University,
               Martin Zinkevich, Yahoo! 

11:40 - 12:10  Evaluation of Election Outcomes under Uncertainty
               Noam Hazon, Yonatan Aumann, Sarit Kraus, Bar-Ilan University 
               and Michael Wooldridge, University of Liverpool
  
12:10 -  2:00  Lunch
  
 2:00 -  2:50  Invited Talk: Trading within Markets having Two-Sided Incomplete
               Information: An Overview
               Mark Satterthwaite, Northwestern University

 2:50 -  3:05  Break
  
 3:05 -  3:55  Invited Talk: Search and the Secretary Problem
               Preston McAfee, Yahoo Research

 3:55 -  4:10  Break
  
 4:10 -  4:40  The Complexity of Rationalizing Matchings
               Shankar Kalyanaraman and Christopher Umans, California Institute of Technology

 4:45 -  5:15  Worst-Case Optimal Redistribution of VCG
               Payments in Multi-Unit Auctions
               Mingyu Guo and Vincent Conitzer, Duke University

 5:20 -  5:50  Generalized Trade Reduction Mechanisms
               Mira Gonen, Tel Aviv University, Rica Gonen, Yahoo, and Elan Pavlov, MIT

 7:30 -  9:30  Workshop Dinner at the Holiday Inn

Friday, October 26, 2007

 8:30 -  9:00  Breakfast and Registration
  
 9:00 -  9:30  Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism
               Dirk Bergemann, Yale University and 
               Juuso Valimaki, Helsinki School of Economics and University of Southampton

 9:35 - 10:05  Efficient Online Mechanisms for Persistent,
               Periodically Inaccessible Self-Interested Agents
               Ruggiero Cavallo, David Parkes, Harvard University and 
               Satinder Singh, University of Michigan
  
10:05 - 10:15  Break
  
10:15 - 11:05  Invited Talk: Prior-free Optimal Auction Design
               Jason Hartline, Microsoft Research

11:05 - 11:20  Break
  
11:20 - 11:50  Prompt Mechanisms for Online Scheduling Problems
               Richard Cole, Shahar Dobzinski and Lisa Fleischer

11:55 - 12:25  Truthful Mechanism Design for Multi-Dimensional Scheduling
               via Cycle Montonicity
               Ron Lavi, Israel Institute of Technology and Chaitanya Swamy, University of Waterloo
  

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