DIMACS Workshop on the Boundary between Economic Theory and Computer Science

October 24 - 26, 2007
DIMACS Center, CoRE Building, Rutgers University

Organizers:

Lance Fortnow, University of Chicago, fortnow@cs.uchicago.edu

Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern University, r-vohra@kellogg.northwestern.edu

Slides

• Dirk Bergemann, Yale University
  Slides - Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism
  Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism

• Joan Feigenbaum, Yale University
  Open Problems in Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing

• Rica Gonen, Yahoo
  Generalized Trade Reductions: The Role of Competition in Designing Budget-Balanced Mechanisms

• Geoff Gordon, Amy Greenwald, Casey Marks, and Martin Zinkevich
  No-Regret Learning in Convex Games

• Mingyu Guo, Duke University
  Slides - Worst-Case Optimal Redistribution of VCG Payments in Multi-Unit Auctions
  Worst-Case Optimal Redistribution of VCG Payments in Multi-Unit Auctions

• Noam Hazon, Bar-Ilan University
  Slides - Evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
  Evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty

• Adam Kalai, Microsoft
  Trust-Based Recommendation Systems

• Ehud Kalai, Northwestern University
  A Commitment Folk Theorem

• John Ledyard, Caltech
  Combinatoric Auctions

• Preston McAfee, Yahoo Research
  Secretary Problem

• David Parkes, Harvard University
  Efficient Online Mechanisms for Persistent, Periodically Inaccessible Self-Interested Agents

• Mark Satterthwaite, Northwestern University
  Double Auction Markets vs. Matching & Bargaining Markets:
  Comparing the Rates at which They Converge to Efficiency

• Nelson Uhan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  Encouraging Cooperation in Sharing Supermodular Costs

• Aviv Zohar, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  Slides - Interdomain Routing and Games
  Interdomain Routing and Games

Workshop Index

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