Program
DIMACS Workshop on Design and Formal Verification of Security Protocols
September 3 - 5, 1997
DIMACS Center, CoRE Building, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
There will be a reception on Tuesday-September 2, 1997, at 7:00 pm,
and dinner on Wednesday, September 3, 1997, at 7:00 pm at:
- Holiday Inn
- 4701 Stelton Road
- Piscataway, NJ
- 732-753 5500
September 3, 1997
Techniques and Models
8:30 - 8:45 Welcome
8:45 - 10:30 Panel 1: Model Checkers
W. Marrero, E. Clarke, S. Jha, Carnegie Mellon University
A Model Checker for Authentication Protocols
Z. Dang, R.A.Kemmerer, University of California at Santa Barbara
Using the ASTRAL Model Checker for Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
T. Kozlowski, S.A. Smolka, SUNY at Stonybrook
Digital Signatures With Encryption: Fact and Fiction
M. Debbabi, M. Mejri, N. Tawbi, I. Yahmadi, Laval University
A New Algorithm for the Automatic Verification of Authentication
Protocols: From Specifications to Flaws and Attack Scenarios
11:00 - 12:30 Panel2: Theorem Provers
J. Bryans, S.Scheider, Royal Holloway and Bedford New College
CSP, PVS, and a Recursive Authentication Protocol
P. Abdulla, B.Jonsson, A.Nylen, University of Uppsala
Modeling and Automated Verification of Authentication Protocols
B. De Decker, F. Piessens, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Cryptolog: A Theorem Prover for Cryptographic Protocols
J. Alvess-foss, T. Soule, University of Idaho
A Weakest Precondition Calculus for Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
12:30 - 1:30 Lunch
1:30 - 3:30 Panel 3: Formal Models
A.W. Roscoe, M.H. Goldsmith, Oxford University Computing Laboratory and
Formal Systems (Europe) Ltd
The Perfect ``Spy'' for Model-Checking Cryptoprotocols
C. Boyd, Queensland University of Technology
Extensional Goals in Authentication Protocols
R. Focardi, A. Ghelli, R. Gorrieri,
Universita' Ca' Foscari di Venezia and Universita' di Bologna
Using Non Interference for the Analysis of Security Protocols
A. Maneki, NSA
An Application of the WDL Theory of System Composition to the
Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
C.A. Gunter, T. Jim, University of Pennsylvania
Design of an Application-Level Security Infrastructure
4:00 - 5:30 Panel 4: Belief Logics and their Combination with Other
Techniques
A. Bleeker, L. Meertens, CWI, Amsterdam
A Semantics for BAN Logic
A. Huima, T. Aura, Helsinki University of Technology
Using a Multimodal Logic to Express Conflicting Interests in Security
Protocols
J.P. Beckmann, P. de Goede, A. Hutchison, University of Cape Town
SPEAR: Security Protocol Engineering and Analysis Resources
D. Kindred, J. Wing, Carnegie Mellon University
Closing the Idealization Gap with Theory Generation
7:00 Dinner at Holiday Day Inn
September 4, 1997
Applications
9:00 - 10:30 Panel 5: Panel on Analysis and Implementation of Secure
Electronic Mail Protocols
chair : M. Stillman
panelists : D. Rosenthal, ORA
S.K. Chin, Syracuse University
M. Barjaktarovic, Wilkes University
11:00 - 12:30 Panel 6: Real Protocols
S. Brackin, Arca Systems
Automatic Formal Analysis of Two Large Commercial Protocols
S. Mocas and T. Schubert, Portland State University
Formal Analysis of IP Layer Security
J. Mitchell, V. Shmatikov, U. Stern, Stanford University
Finite-State Analysis of SSL 3.0 and related Protocols
F. Germeau and G. Leduc, Universite de Liege
Model-based Design and Verification of Security Protocols using LOTOS
G. Bella and L. C. Paulson, Cambridge University
Using Isabelle to Prove Properties of the Kerberos Authentication System
12:30 - 1:30 Lunch
1:30 - 3:30 Panel 7: What Designers Need From Formal Methods
chair : C. Meadows, NRL
panelists : S. Kent, BBN
C. Ellison, Cybercash
J. Brainard, RSA Laboratories
R. Cordery, Pitney Bowes
3:30 - 5:30 Demos
September 5, 1997
Issues and New Directions
9:00 - 10:30 Panel 8: Design vs. Verification: Is Verification the
Wrong Approach?
chair : Y. Desmedt, U. of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
panelists : M. Burmester, Royal Holloway and Bedford New College
J. Millen, MITRE
others TBA
11:00 - 12:30 Panel 9: High Fidelity
A. Gillet, M. Joye, J.-J. Quisquater, University of
Louvain
Cautionary Note for Protocol Designers: Security Proof is not Enough
S. Stubblebine and C. Meadows, AT&T and NRL
On Known and Chosen Cipher Pairs
T. Markham, Secure Computing
Cryptographic Module Flaws and Analysis Techniques
C. Gunter, I. Lee, A. Scedrov, University of Pennsylvania
Two Weak Links in the Formal Methods Chain
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Document last modified on February 28, 1997.