

Constrained Private Mechanisms for Count Data

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Private Data Release

- ◆ Many problems require collection of aggregate data
 - Simple count queries for statistics
 - Frequency parameters of analytic models
- ◆ The model of **Differential Privacy (DP)** gives a rigorous statistical definition
 - Requires each output to have a similar probability as inputs vary
- ◆ Our aim is to design *mechanisms* that have nice properties
 - A mechanism defines the output distribution, given the input
 - We seek accurate, usable outputs, from small groups




Mechanism Design

- ◆ We want to construct optimal mechanisms for data release
 - **Target function**: each user has a bit; release the sum of bits
 - Input range = output range = $\{0, 1, \dots, n\}$
- ◆ Model a mechanism as a matrix of conditional probabilities $\Pr[i | j]$
- ◆ DP introduces constraints on the matrix entries:
$$\alpha \Pr[i | j] \leq \Pr[i | j+1]$$
 - Neighboring entries should differ by a factor of at most $0 < \alpha < 1$
- ◆ We want to penalize outputs that are far from the truth:
Define **loss function** $L_p = \sum_{i,j} w_j \Pr[i | j] |i - j|^p$ for weights (prior) w_j
 - We will focus on the core case of $p=0$, and uniform prior
 - L_0 loss function is then just the sum of weights off-diagonal
 - Equivalently, maximize trace of the probability matrix

Unconstrained Mechanism: GM


- ◆ Optimizing for L_0 loss function yields a highly structured result:

$$\begin{pmatrix} x & x\alpha & x\alpha^2 & x\alpha^3 & \dots & x\alpha^n \\ y\alpha & y & y\alpha & y\alpha^2 & \dots & y\alpha^{n-1} \\ y\alpha^2 & y\alpha & y & y\alpha & \dots & y\alpha^{n-2} \\ y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha & y & \dots & y\alpha^{n-3} \\ y\alpha^4 & y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha & \dots & y\alpha^{n-4} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ x\alpha^n & x\alpha^{n-1} & x\alpha^{n-2} & x\alpha^{n-3} & \dots & x \end{pmatrix}$$



- ◆ Here $x = 1/(1+\alpha)$, $y=(1-\alpha)/(1+\alpha)$, $L_0=2\alpha/(1+\alpha)$
- ◆ This is the **truncated geometric mechanism GM** [Ghosh et al. 09]:
 - ◆ Add symmetric geometric noise with parameter α to true answer
 - ◆ Truncate to range $\{0\dots n\}$
- ◆ We prove this is the **unique** such optimal mechanism for L_0
 - ◆ But it has some issues!

Limitations of GM



Example for
 $\alpha = 0.9$

- ◆ GM tends to place a lot of weight on $\{0, n\}$ when α is large
 - But GM's L_0 score is the optimal value: $2\alpha / (1+\alpha)$
 - The issue is even worse if optimizing for L_1 or L_2 objective functions!
 - We seek more **structured** mechanisms that have similar score

Mechanism Properties

We give 7 constraints to impose more structure on mechanisms:

- ◆ **Row Honesty RH**: $\forall i, j : \Pr[i | i] \geq \Pr[i | j]$ (true value is most likely)
- ◆ **Row Monotonicity RM**: prob. decreases from $\Pr[i | i]$ along row
 - Row Monotonicity implies Row Honesty
- ◆ **Column Honesty CH** and **Column Monotonicity CM**, symmetrically
- ◆ **Fairness F**: $\forall i, j : \Pr[i | i] = \Pr[j | j]$ (same probability of truthfulness)
 - Fairness and row honesty implies column honesty
- ◆ **Weak honesty WH**: $\Pr[i | i] \geq 1/(n+1)$ (at least uniformly truthful)
 - Achievable by the trivial uniform mechanism UM $\Pr[i | j] = 1/(n+1)$
- ◆ **Symmetry**: $\forall i, j : \Pr[i | j] = \Pr[n-i | n-j]$
 - Symmetry is achievable with no loss of objective function

Finding Optimal Mechanisms

- ◆ **Goal:** find optimal mechanisms for a given set of properties
- ◆ Can solve with optimization techniques
 - Objective function is linear in the variables $\Pr[i|j]$
 - Properties can all be specified as linear constraints on $\Pr[i|j]$ s
 - DP property is a linear constraint on $\Pr[i|j]$ s
- ◆ So can specify any desired set of combinations and solve an LP
 - **Always feasible:** just uniform guessing (UM) meets all constraints
- ◆ **Patterns emerge:** of 127 possibilities, only few distinct outcomes
 - Aim to understand the structure of optimal mechanisms
 - We seek **explicit constructions**
 - More efficient and amenable to analysis than solving LPs

Explicit Fair Mechanism EM


- ◆ We construct a new ‘**explicit fair mechanism**’ (uniform diagonal):

$$\begin{pmatrix} y & y\alpha & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^4 & y\alpha^4 & y\alpha^4 & y\alpha^4 \\ y\alpha & y & y\alpha & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^3 \\ y\alpha & y\alpha & y & y\alpha & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^3 \\ y\alpha^2 & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha & y & y\alpha & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha^2 \\ y\alpha^2 & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha & y & y\alpha & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha^2 \\ y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha & y & y\alpha & y\alpha \\ y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha & y & y\alpha \\ y\alpha^4 & y\alpha^4 & y\alpha^4 & y\alpha^4 & y\alpha^3 & y\alpha^2 & y\alpha & y \end{pmatrix}$$

- ◆ Each column is a permutation of the same set of values
- ◆ Has all our properties: column & row monotonicity, symmetry
- ◆ This is (one) **optimal** fair mechanism:
 - ◆ Entries in middle column are all as small as DP will allow
 - ◆ Hence y cannot be bigger
 - ◆ Cost slightly higher than Geometric Mechanism

Summary of mechanisms

- ◆ Based on relations between properties, we can conclude:




- ◆ Fair Mechanism (EM) and Geometric Mechanism (GM) have explicit forms
- ◆ Two Weak Mechanism variants (WM) found by solving LPs

Property	GM	UM	EM	WM
Symmetry (S)	Y	Y	Y	Y
Row Monotone (RM)	Y	Y	Y	Y
Column Monotone (CM)	—	Y	Y	Y
Fairness (F)	N	Y	Y	N
Weak Honesty (WH)	—	Y	Y	Y
\mathbb{L}_0	$\frac{2\alpha}{1+\alpha}$	1	$\approx \frac{2\alpha}{1+\alpha} \cdot \frac{n+1}{n}$	$\geq \frac{2\alpha}{1+\alpha}$

Comparing Mechanisms

- ◆ Heatmaps comparing mechanisms for $\alpha = 0.9$, $n=4$






- ◆ Heatmaps look very different but their L_0 scores are close:

	GM	EM	WM
L_0 score	0.764	0.776	0.774




L_0 score behaviour

- ◆ L_0 score varies as a function of n and α
 - WM converges on GM for $n \geq 2\alpha / (1-\alpha)$




Performance on real data

- ◆ Using UCI Adult data set of demographic data
 - Construct small groups in the data, target different binary attributes
 - Compute Root-Mean-Squared Error of per-group outputs
 - EM and WM generally preferable for wide range of α values



Summary



- ◆ Carefully crafted mechanisms for data release can fix anomalies/unexpected behavior for small groups
- ◆ Many more natural questions for small groups
 - Interpret constraints as regularization
 - Find closed form solutions for other objective functions (L_1 , L_2)
- ◆ More general data release problems:
 - **Structured data**: other statistics, graphs, movement patterns
 - **Unstructured data**: text, images, video?

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