

# Locally Private Release of Marginal Statistics

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# Privacy with a coin toss



Perhaps the simplest possible formal privacy algorithm:

- ◆ **Scenario.** Each user has a single private **bit** of information
  - Encoding e.g. political/sexual/religious preference, illness, etc.



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- ◆ **Analysis.** Gives **differential privacy** with parameter  $\epsilon = \ln(p/(1-p))$ 
  - Works well in theory, but would anyone ever use this?

# Privacy in practice



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- ◆ Local Differential privacy is state of the art in 2017:  
**Randomized response invented in 1965**: five decade lead time!

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1 bit can tell you a lot, but can we do more?

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Gender/Obese	0	1
0	0.28	0.22
1	0.29	0.21

Disease/Smoke	0	1
0	0.55	0.15
1	0.10	0.20

# Nail, meet hammer

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- ◆ **First observation**: a sampling trick
  - If we release  $n$  bits of information per user, the error is  $n/\sqrt{N}$
  - If we sample  $1$  out of  $n$  bits, the error is  $\sqrt{n/N}$
  - Quadratically better to sample than to share!



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
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  - ◆ If  $k$  is small (say, 2), and  $d$  is large (say 10s), Approach 1 is better
    - But there's another approach to try...

# Hadamard transform




Instead of materializing the data, we can transform it

- ◆ Via **Hadamard transform** (the discrete Fourier transform for the binary hypercube)
  - Simple and fast to apply

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
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
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- Can estimate global coefficients by sampling and averaging

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
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- ◆ Yields error proportional to  $2^{k/2}d^{k/2}/\sqrt{N}$


- Better than both previous methods (in theory)

# Empirical behaviour




- ◆ Compare three methods: Hadamard based (**Inp\_HT**), marginal materialization (**Marg\_PS**), Expectation maximization (Inp\_EM)
- ◆ Measure sum of absolute error in materializing 2-way marginals
- ◆  $N = 0.5M$  individuals, vary privacy parameter  $\epsilon$  from 0.4 to 1.4

# Applications – $\chi$ -squared test



- ◆ Anonymized, binarized NYC taxi data
- ◆ Compute  $\chi$ -squared statistic to test correlation
- ◆ Want to be same side of the line as the non-private value!

# Application – building a Bayesian model



- ◆ **Aim:** build the tree with highest mutual information (MI)
- ◆ Plot shows MI on the ground truth data for evaluation purposes