- Start Date:
August 2, 2001
- Event Start Time:
12:00 PM
- Event End Time:
1:00 PM
- Organizers:
Kia Dalili
- Seminar Series:
REU Seminar
- Presenter(s):
Peter J. Slater - University of Alabama in Huntsville
- Event Location:
CoRE 301
- Abstract:
Given a set C of candidates, a set V of voters, and a list of the orderings of the candidates by each voter, a social choice procedure selects a subset S of C as the set of "winners". It is known that a small set of desireable conditions makes it impossible to find a social choice procedure satisfying all of these conditions for an arbitrary set of voter orderings. This talk will address questions related to the desireability of various choice procedures when we are restricted to voter orderings based on distance in graphs.