- Start Date:
June 10, 2025
- Event Start Time:
12:00 PM
- Event End Time:
1:00 PM
- Organizers:
Lazaros Gallos
- Event Location:
DIMACS Seminar room
- Seminar Series:
REU Seminar
- Presenter(s):
Daniel Schoepflin - Rutgers University
- Abstract:
How should we design algorithms which interact with human agents, and how can we make these algorithms robust to potential human manipulation? Algorithmic mechanism design, which sits at the intersection of computer science, economics, and operations research, is a field seeking answers to these very practical questions. This talk will serve as an introduction to (algorithmic) mechanism design and some of the foundational questions therein. Then, using the important microeconomic question of auction design as a case-study, we will see how recent developments in mechanism design attempt to better align our theory with real-world practice. We will discuss how certain algorithmic paradigms are experimentally and mathematically simpler for humans to understand than others. Finally, we will briefly explore how to apply the lens of approximation algorithms to guide the design of simple mechanisms with good performance guarantees.
