dimacs logo color

Events

Event Calendar

« Previous Month

August 2026

Next Month »
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Seminar Details

Strategyproofness You Can Explain to Your Grandmother

  • Start Date: November 16, 2020
  • Event Start Time: 4:00 PM
  • Event End Time: 5:00 PM
  • Seminar Series: DIMACS Matching Reading Group
  • Presenter(s): Clay Thomas - Princeton University
  • Event Location: Online Event
  • Presentation Type: Stand Alone Presentation
  • Abstract:

    Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) has emerged in recent years as a "gold standard" for mechanisms which must interact with agents who are not hyper-rational [Li]. Very briefly, a mechanism is OSP if it is strategyproof, and moreover its strategyproofness can be recognized by agents who are unable to perform contingency reasoning.

    In this talk, we discuss the prospect of obviously strategyproof matching mechanisms, with a conceptual focus on school choice mechanisms, and a technical focus on examples of student-proposing deferred acceptance in which the schools have fixed preferences. The main finding [AG] is that deferred acceptance typically cannot be OSP implemented.

    [Li] Li, Shengwu. "Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms." American Economic Review 107.11 (2017): 3257-87.

    [AG] Itai Ashlagi and Yannai A. Gonczarowski. "Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof." Journal of Economic Theory 177 (2018):405-425.