• Understanding non-monotonicity for two independent items
  • Project Year: 2022
  • REU Student (s):   Jachym Mierva | Charles University (Prague, Czech Republic)   |   David Sychrovsky | Charles University (Prague, Czech Republic)  
  • Student 1 Institution: Charles University (Prague, Czech Republic)
  • Student 2 Institution: Charles University (Prague, Czech Republic)
  • Project Mentor: Ariel Schvartzman
  • Project Mentor Area: DIMACS
  • Project Abstract: Sale of independent items is an often studied problem. Myerson's lemma provides an efficient way to realize an optimal trade of a single item. However, in a multi-item setting, the results can be non-intuitive. It has been shown before that in some cases, buyers having a higher valuation for sold items can lead to lower revenue of the seller. This non-monotonicity is not yet understood. In this paper, we provide conditions which guarantee monotonicity and an algorithm to generate non-monotone examples. We show that such examples are rare, even though the revenue can change significantly in some cases.