- Unique Solution to the House Assignment Problem for N = 4
- Project Year:
2021
- REU Student (s):
David Ryzak | Charles University (Prague, Czech Republic)
| David Sychrovsky | Charles University (Prague, Czech Republic)
- Student 1 Institution:
Charles University (Prague, Czech Republic)
- Student 2 Institution:
Charles University (Prague, Czech Republic)
- Project Mentor:
Ron Holzman
- Project Mentor Area:
Mathematics, Princeton University
- Project Abstract:
We study a problem from mechanism design where we try to find a mechanism which assigns N houses to N players based on their preferences with desirable properties. These aim to unsure fairness and efficiency while limiting exploitation by the players and give incentives to tell the truth. We aim to show that the Random serial dictatorship (RSD) is the only mechanism with these prescribed properties. It has been shown before that RSD in unique for N=3. We provide a computer aided proof of uniqueness for N=4 as well as rigorous for selected preference profiles for arbitrary N.
