DIMACS Workshop on Auctions with Transaction Costs

March 22 - 23, 2007
DIMACS Center, CoRE Building, Rutgers University

Organizers:
Eric Rasmusen, Indiana University, erasmuse@indiana.edu
Michael Rothkopf, Rutgers University, rothkopf@rutcor.rutgers.edu
Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University, sandholm+@cs.cmu.edu
Presented under the auspices of the Special Focus on Computation and the Socio-Economic Sciences.

Workshop Program:


Thursday, March 22, 2007

  8:15 -  9:00  Breakfast and Registration

  9:00 -  9:15  Introductory remarks
                Brenda Latka, DIMACS Associate Director

  9:15 -  9:30  Transaction Costs in Auctions: A Classification Scheme
                Michael Rothkopf, Rutgers University

  9:30 - 10:15  Overview of our work on costly valuation 
                computation/information acquisition in auctions: 
                Strategy, counterspeculation, and deliberation equilibrium
                Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University

 10:15 - 10:45  Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's
                Own Private Value in Auctions
          
                Getting Carried Away in Auctions as Imperfect Value Discovery
                Eric Rasmusen, Indiana University

 10:45 - 11:00  Break

 11:00 - 11:30  Valuation Uncertainty and Imperfect Introspection 
                in Second-Price Auctions
                David Thompson, UBC
 
11:30 -  12:00  Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions
                Kate Larson

12:00 -   1:00  Lunch

  1:00 -  2:30  Efficient Dynamic Auctions 
                Dirk Bergemann, Yale University

  2:30 -  3:00  The Stable Roommates Problem Revisited
                Thayer Morrill, University of Maryland 
  
  3:00 -  3:15  Break

  3:15 -  4:00  RFQ Auctions with Supplier Qualification Screening
	        Zhixi Wan and Damian R. Beil

  4:00 -  5:00  The Hungarian Auction
                Larry Ausubel, University of Maryland 

  6:00          Dinner

Friday, March 23, 2007

  8:30 -  9:00  Breakfast and Registration

  9:00 - 10:00  Clearing Algorithms for Barter Exchange Markets:
                Enabling Nationwide Kidney Exchanges
                Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University

 10:00 - 10:30  Money Burning and Implementation
		Jason D. Hartline

 10:30- 10:45   Break

 10:45 - 11:15  Slow Dutch Auctions
                Michael Rothkopf, Rutgers University

 11:15 - 12:00  The Need for Speed: Non-Price Considerations in Auction 
                Design at the Dutch Flower Auctions
                Otto Koppius 

 12:00 -  1:00  Lunch

  1:00 -  2:15  Endogenous Competition Alters the Structure of Optimal Auctions
                Ronald Harstad, University of Missouri

  2:15 -  3:00  Efficient Meta-Deliberation Auctions
                David Parkes, Harvard University

  3:00 -  3:15  Break

  3:15 -  3:45  Optimal Auctions with Participation Costs
                Okan Yilankaya, University of British Columbia

  3:45 -  4:15  The Impact of Marketing Messages During Auctions
                Eric Greenleaf, New York Universeity

  4:15 -  4:45  Where should auction theory go next? General discussion

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Document last modified on March 21, 2007.