The analysis of cryptographic protocols is a fundamental and challenging area of network security research. Traditionally, there have been two main approaches. One is the logic approach aimed at developing automated tools for the formal verification of protocols. The other is the computational or complexity-theoretic approach that characterizes protocol security as a set of computational tasks and proves protocol security via reduction to the strength of the underlying cryptographic functions. Although these two lines of work share a common goal, there has been little commonality between them until the last year or two.
The goal of this workshop is to promote work on security analysis of protocols and provide a forum for cooperative research combining the logical and complexity-based approaches.
The workshop will include tutorials on the basics of each approach and will allow researchers from both communities to talk about their current work.
Several tutorials and a number of research talks have already been selected. However, some additional program slots have been set aside for late-breaking Contributions from interested participants. If you are interested in giving a talk, please send a title and short abstract (1-3 pages) to the organizers, Ran Canetti and John Mitchell, with subject heading "DIMACS Security Protocols - title and abstract," by May 15, 2004.