DIMACS Workshop on Security Analysis of Protocols

June 7 - 9, 2004
DIMACS Center, CoRE Building, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ

Organizers:

John Mitchell, Stanford, mitchell@cs.stanford.edu

Ran Canetti, IBM Watson, canetti@watson.ibm.com

• Iliano Cervesato, NRL
  Fine-Grained MSR Specifications for Quantitative Security Analysis

• Juan Garay, Bell Labs
  A Framework for Fair (Multi-Party) Computation

• Radu Grosu, SUNY Stony Brook
  Monte-Carlo Analysis of Protocols

• Carl A. Gunter, University of Pennsylvania
  Formal Analysis of Availability

• Joshua D. Guttman, MITRE
  Tutorial: Proving protocol properties

• Jonathan Herzog, MIT
  Universally Composable Symbolic Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols

• Jan Jürjens, TU Munich
  Towards Automated Computationally Faithful Verification of Cryptoprotocols

• Bruce Kapron, University of Victoria
  Tutorial: Formal representations of polynomial-time algorithms and security

• Ralf Kusters, University of Kiel
  Sequential Process Calculus and Machine Models for Simulation-based Security

• Yehuda Lindell, IBM Research
  Tutorial - Secure Composition of Multiparty Protocols

• Christopher Lynch, Naval Research Lab
  Sound Approximations to Diffie-Hellman Using Rewrite Rules

• Nancy Lynch, MIT
  Modeling and Analyzing Security Protocols Using I/O Automata

• Dominic Mayers, CalTech
  Universal Composability with Documented Ideal Protocols

• Cathy Meadows, NRL
  Towards a Hierarchy of Cryptographic Protocol Models

• Daniele Micciancio, UCSD
  Tutorial: Towards cryptographically sound formal analysis

• John Mitchell, Stanford
  Probailistic Polynomial-Time Process Calculus for Security Protocol Analysis

• Olivier Pereira and Jean-Jacques Quisquater, UCL
  Dolev-Yao-type Abstraction of Modular Exponentiation - the Cliques Case Study

• Marinella Petrocchi, IIT-CNR, Italy
  A Framework for Security Analysis with Team Automata

• Birgit Pfitzmann, IBM Research
  A Reactively Secure Dolev-Yao-style Cryptographic Library

• Manoj Prabhakaran and Amit Sahai, Princeton University
  New Notions of Security: Achieving Universal Composability without Trusted Setup

• Peter Ryan, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne
  Formal methods and protocol analysis

• Andre Scedrov, University of Pennsylvania
  A probabilistic polynomial-time calculus for the analysis of cryptographic protocols

• Vitaly Shmatikov, SRI
  Tutorial: Constraint-based methods: Adding computational properties to symbolic models

• Sabrina Tarento, INRIA
  Machine-Checked Formalization of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model

• Angelo Troina, Univerity of Pisa
  Message Equivalence and Imperfect Cryptography in a Formal Model

• Thomas Wilke, Kiel University
  Automata-based analysis of recursive cryptographic protocols

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