Abstract

This week will cover two papers:

Title 1: An Experimental Investigation of Preference Misrepresentation in the Residency Match
Authors: Alex Rees-Jones and Samuel Skowronek

Paper Abstract: The development and deployment of matching procedures that incentivize truthful preference reporting is considered one of the major successes of market design research. In this study, we test the degree to which these procedures succeed in eliminating preference misrepresentation. We administered an online experiment to 1,714 medical students immediately after their participation in the medical residency match—a leading field application of strategy-proof market design. When placed in an analogous, incentivized matching task, we find that 23% of participants misrepresent their preferences. We explore the factors that predict preference misrepresentation, including cognitive ability, strategic positioning, overconfidence, expectations, advice, and trust. We discuss the implications of this behavior for the design of allocation mechanisms and the social welfare in markets that use them

Link to paper.

Title 2: The Mechanism Is Truthful, Why Aren't You?
Authors: Avinatan Hassidim, Déborah Marciano, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer

Paper Abstract: Honesty is the best policy in the face of a strategy-proof mechanism--irrespective of others' behavior, the best course of action is to report one's preferences truthfully. We review evidence from different markets in different countries and find that a substantial percentage of participants do not report their true preferences to the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance mechanism. Two recurring correlates of preference misrepresentation are lower cognitive ability and the expectation of stronger competition. We evaluate possible explanations, which we hope will inform practicing market designers.

Link to paper.

This week's presenter is: Anson Kahng, Carnegie Mellon University.